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Abstract
This paper investigates the identification, the determinacy and
the stability of ad hoc, ”quasi-optimal” and optimal policy rules aug-
mented with financial stability indicators (such as asset prices devia-
tions from their fundamental values) and minimizing the volatility of
the policy interest rates, when the central bank precommits to finan-
cial stability. Firstly, ad hoc and quasi-optimal rules parameters of
financial stability indicators cannot be identified. For those rules, non
zero policy rule parameters of financial stability indicators are obser-
vationally equivalent to rule parameters set to zero in another rule,
so that they are unable to inform monetary policy. Secondly, under
controllability conditions, optimal policy rules parameters of financial
stability indicators can all be identified, along with a bounded solu-
tion stabilizing an unstable economy as in Woodford (2003), with
determinacy of the initial conditions of non- predetermined variables.
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”If we ran the Taylor rule regression in data generated by the
new-Keynesian model, we would recover the shock autocorrelation
process, not the Taylor rule parameter”. Cochrane (2011, online
appendix, p.15).
”We may omit consideration of the transversality conditions,
as we shall consider only bounded solutions to these equations,
which necessarily satisfy the transversality conditions.” Woodford
(2003, p.865).
1 Introduction
Should financial stability concerns influence monetary policy decisions? For a
policy-maker (Stein (2014)), the argument rests on three assumptions. First,
the Federal Reserve cares about minimizing a quadratic loss objective func-
tion which includes a ”risk” term, given by the variance of realized unem-
ployment, which depend on financial market vulnerability. ”Second, there
is some variable summarizing financial market vulnerability which is influ-
enced by monetary policy... The third and final assumption is that the risks
associated with an elevated value of financial market vulnerability cannot be
fully offset at zero cost with other non-monetary tools, such as financial reg-
ulation” (Stein (2014), p. 2-3). In this context, the recent macro-prudential
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature compares the out-
comes of ad hoc Taylor rules of the central bank ”not augmented” versus
”macroprudential rules” augmented with macroprudential indicators such
as asset prices and/or households’, non-financial firms’ and banks’ leverage,
credit spreads, liquidity ratios and so on (e.g. Beau, Clerc and Mojon (2012),
Smets (2013), Chadha, Corrado and Corrado (2013), Gambacorta and Sig-
noretti (2014)).
This paper investigates in a general framework under which conditions
the augmented policy rule parameters of financial stability indicators are
identified within ad hoc, quasi-optimal or optimal policy rules under commit-
ment to financial stability. It provides complementary results with respect to
the lack of identification of non augmented ad hoc Taylor rules parameters
found by Cochrane (2011), Komunjer and Ng (2011) and Caglar, Chadha
and Shibayama (2012).
With linear quadratic rational expectations optimal rules, the policy-
maker determines optimal feedback policy rule parameters as a Stackel-
berg leader in a dynamic game with the private sector. She minimizes a
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quadratic loss function subject to the private sector first order conditions,
linearized around an equilibrium (Woodford (2003), Blake and Kirsanova
(2012), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19), Miller and Salmon (1985)
among others). DSGE models include n ”predetermined” variables with
known initial value, such as stationary auto-correlated shocks and capital
stocks and m ”non-predetermined” variables which are ”forward” rational
expectations variables with unknown initial values. Examples here are ex-
pected inflation, output gap, asset prices, private credit and so on. Levine
and Currie (1987) called a policy rule ”quasi-optimal” whenever it includes
constraints for the parameters of non-predetermined variables to be equal to
zero. ”Quasi-optimal” policy rules are an intermediate modeling step towards
time consistent policy rules (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)).
With quasi-optimal policy rules and ad hoc rules, the policy-maker and
the private sector assume transversality conditions (there are no bubbles for
non-predetermined variables such as asset prices), seeking Blanchard and
Kahn’s (1980) unique stable solution. By assumption, it follows that non-
predetermined variables are a linear function (with time invariant coeffi-
cients) of predetermined variables for all periods of the model. Then, if
one substitutes non-predetermined variables by predetermined variables in a
policy rule with rule parameters of non predetermined variables which are
not all equal to zero, it leads to another observationally equivalent policy rule
with rule parameters for non predetermined variables which are all equal to
zero. The parameters of non-predetermined variables cannot be identified in
a quasi-optimal or an ad hoc rule. In more technical words, the rank of the
dynamic system is equal to the number n of predetermined variables and the
eigenvalues related to m ”Jordan transformed” non-predetermined variables
have been set to zero. Hence, in those models, discussing whether Central
Bank policy makers should augment or not Taylor rules with asset prices or
financial instability indicators does not inform monetary policy.
If not Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) conditions, then what? This pa-
per proposes sufficient conditions for the identification of rule parameters
of non predetermined variables in a general case of Woodford’s (2003) and
Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2012, chapter 19) optimal policy rules under com-
mitment. These optimal rules are ”over stable”, according to Levine and
Currie’s (1987) definition, as the number of stable dimensions of the dy-
namic system (stable eigenvalues) is equal to n+m the number of variables:
it is larger than the number n of predetermined variables. The rank of the
dynamic system under control is equal to n+m.
Kalman (1960) defined a controllable dynamic system with linear feedback
rule when a policy-maker is able to move this dynamic system in any state
during any variation of time. A sufficient condition for a controllable system
3
is that the policy rule instruments can have an effect on all the (”Jordan”
transformed) variables, in particular, all the non-predetermined variables.
This is related to Stein’s (2014) second assumption: there is some variable
summarizing financial market vulnerability which is influenced by monetary
policy. In DSGE models, a subset of a system can be checked to be con-
trollable. This subset excludes stationary auto-regressive shocks which are
exogenous, hence not controllable.
This paper states that if this subset of the dynamic system of a DSGE
is controllable and if all its eigenvalues are distinct and stable, then the lin-
ear quadratic regulator optimal policy rule parameters of all controllable
variables, including non predetermined variables (more precisely, their pre-
determined shadow prices), are unique, this set of linear quadratic regulator
rule parameters has a one to one correspondence with the set of distinct and
stable eigenvalues, and all rule parameters can be identified in optimal policy
interest rules under commitment a` la Woodford (2003). Indeed, testing op-
timal rules under commitment against quasi-optimal rules or ad hoc rules is
impossible, because the rule parameters of financial instability indicators such
as asset prices in ”quasi-optimal”, ad hoc and time consistent ”augmented”
Taylor rules cannot be identified, and then cannot be estimable.
The paper then mentions a very important result for the determinacy of
New Keynesian models with optimal rules under commitment, which is the
opposite of the conventional determinacy criterion for ad hoc rules (Cochrane
(2011)). The conventional determinacy criterion is the equality of the number
of stable eigenvalues to the number of predetermined variables (Blanchard
and Kahn’s (1980)). The conventional view leads to the alternative: ”bubbles
versus sunspots” (Loisel (2009)). New Keynesian macroprudential DSGE ad
hoc augmented Taylor rules should not stabilize potential bubbles of m non-
predetermined variables such as asset prices and private credit in order to
maintain the uniqueness of a knife-edge stable equilibrium path, knowing
that infinitesimal deviations from this path lead to diverging bubbles for the
m non-predetermined variables. Else, there will be an infinity of initial values
(”sunspots”) for the m non-predetermined variables, if ever diverging bub-
bles are stabilized by Old Keynesian policy-makers rules. However, several
economists consider that the knife edge equilibrium is not unique and that
an infinity of rational expectations multiple equilibria with diverging paths
(bubbles) are also valid (Burmeister (1980), Cochrane (2011), Christiaans
(2013)).
Quasi-optimal and time-consistent rules under commitment may face mul-
tiple equilibria and indeterminacy when satisfying Blanchard and Kahn’s
(1980) condition of the equality between the number of stable eigenvalues
and the number of predetermined variables (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)). If
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the system is controllable with n +m stable dimensions (stable eigenvalues
related to ”stable” eigenvectors), there are a number of ways to find n eigen-
vectors related to stable eigenvalues equal to the number n of predetermined
variables, satisfying Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) condition. This number is
equal to the number of subsets of n distinct eigenvectors among n+m eigen-
vectors (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)). For optimal rules under commitment,
there is only one subset of n +m distinct eigenvectors of stable eigenvalues
among n + m eigenvectors. Finally, if the system is controllable, the La-
grange multipliers of non-predetermined variables with optimal rules under
commitment are equal to zero at the initial date, in order to minimize the
marginal value of the loss function. This allows to ”determine” the unique
initial value of each non-predetermined variable, such as financial stability
indicators.
Additionally, this paper highlights two useful properties of optimal rules
under commitment which inform monetary policy. Empirical literature docu-
ments that unexpected changes in the nominal interest rate have a significant
effect on real stock prices and on housing prices (Challe and Giannitsarou
(2014)). However, Central Bankers fear that stabilizing asset prices and
credit bubbles may lead to too much volatility of their interest rate. A first
issue faced by policy-makers is then to set a trade-off between the policy rate
volatility versus targeting financial stability, understood as leaning against
credit and asset price bubbles. This issue cannot be informative with ”quasi-
optimal” rules, as non-predetermined variables cannot be identified.
A second issue is related to the ability of macro-prudential policy to de-
crease the wealth effect channel of financial instability, i.e. the correlation
between asset prices and capital. This issue cannot be addressed with ”quasi-
optimal” rules, because there is a fixed exact linear relationship (and correla-
tion) between non-predetermined variables (asset prices) and predetermined
variables (capital) following Blanchard and Kahn (1980) assumption.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 and 2 presents identification of
rule parameters with quasi-optimal versus with optimal rules under commit-
ment to financial stability. Section 3 concludes with potential extensions.
2 Identification in ”quasi-optimal” rules with
pre-commitment assuming no-bubbles
Our analysis uses without lack of generality the deterministic setup. The
certainty equivalence property of linear quadratic optimal control models
implies that optimal rule parameters do not depend from an appropriate
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vector of random shocks which can be added (Anderson et al. (1996), Blake
and Kirsanova (2012)). The Central Bank as a Stackelberg leader commits
to a sequence of decision rules at time 0, in a Ramsey problem (Ljundqvist
and Sargent (2012), chapter 19). She minimizes her loss function by finding
a sequence of decision rules rt:
max
{rt,kt+1,qt+1}
− 1
2
+∞∑
t=0
βt


(
kt−k∗
k∗
)T
Qnn
(
kt−k∗
k∗
)
+
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)T
Qmm
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)
+
(
kt−k∗
k∗
)T
Qnm
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)
+
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)T
Qmn
(
kt−k∗
k∗
)
+ρ (rt − r∗)2


= −
(
k0−k∗
k∗
q0−q∗
q∗
)T
P
(
k0−k∗
k∗
q0−q∗
q∗
)
(1)
The Central Bank loss function is subject to a closed loop dynamics
including the feedback rule:
(
kt+1
tqt+1
)
=


(
Ann Anm
Amn Amm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
(
Bn1
Bm1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(
F1n F1m
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−F


(
kt
qt
)
+ γzt
(2)
where β ′ is a discount factor, kt is an (n× 1) vector of variables predeter-
mined at t with initial conditions k0 given (shocks can straightforwardly be
included into this vector); q is an (m× 1) vector of variables non-predetermined
at t; z is an (k × 1) vector of exogenous variables; r is the policy interest rate,
with a linear policy feedback rule −F which is a 1 × (n +m) matrix; Qij
is a i × j positive symmetric semi-definite matrix and ρ > 0 is a scalar
(both define the Central Bank preferences), P is a symmetric matrix (when
Q is symmetric) which provides the optimal value of the loss function, A is
(n +m) × (n+m) matrix, B is a (n +m) × 1 matrix, γ is a (n+m) × k
matrix, tqt is the agents expectations of qt+1 defined as follows:
tqt+1 = Et (qt+1 p Ωt) . (3)
Ωt is the information set at date t (it includes past and current values of all
endogenous variables and may include future values of exogenous variables).
According to Blanchard and Kahn (1980), a predetermined variable is a
function only of variables known at date t so that kt+1 = tkt+1 whatever the
realization of the variables in Ωt+1. A non-predetermined variable can be
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a function of any variable in Ωt+1, so that we can conclude that qt+1 = tqt+1
only if the realization of all variables in Ωt+1 are equal to their expectations
conditional on Ωt.
Boundary conditions for the policy-maker’s first order conditions are the
given initial conditions for predetermined variables k0 and Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) hypothesis ruling out ”bubbles”, i.e. the exponential growth of
the expectations of w =(k,q, z):
∀t ∈ N,∃wt ∈ Rk,∃θt ∈ R, such that |Et (wt+1 p Ωt)| ≤ (1 + i)θt wt, ∀i ∈ R+.
(4)
Following Levine and Currie (1987) definition, a policy rule which im-
poses restrictions on the parameters of the rule is ”quasi-optimal” in the
sense that it is suboptimal in the general class of linear feedback rules but
optimal within its own class. More precisely, the Central Bank is looking
for such a quasi-optimal rule which imposes restrictions on the coefficients
related to the non-predetermined variables. When the non-predetermined
variables are excluded from the policy feedback rule, quasi-optimal rules
are time consistent, because Calvo’s (1978) shadow prices related to non
predetermined variables (denoted µq) are no longer computed in the policy-
maker’s optimization. These quasi-optimal rules lead naturally to a third
type of rules: optimal time-consistent rules without pre-commitment related
to discretionary policy where the policy-maker recursively optimizes again at
each future period (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)).
Theorem 1 (Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972, p.198)). If the matrix
pair (An+m,n+m Bn+m,1) is controllable, i.e. if the Kalman (1960) controlla-
bility matrix has full rank:
rank
(
B AB A2B ... An+m−1B
)
= n+m (5)
the eigenvalues of A−BF can be arbitrarily located in the complex plane
(complex eigenvalues, however, occur in complex conjugate pairs) by choosing
a policy rule matrix F accordingly.
The policy-maker considers only the set of policy rules F (n) such that
A−BF has exactly nS = n stable eigenvalues equal to the number of prede-
termined variables, in the hope to obtain Blanchard and Kahn (1980) unique
rational expectations solution. Let M (F) be the matrix of left eigenvectors
of A−BF partitioned so that (indexes represent dimensions of the block
matrices):
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(
M (F)nn M (F)nm
M (F)mn M (F)mm
)(
Ann −Bn1F1n Anm −Bn1F1m
Amn −Bm1F1n Amm −Bm1F1m
)
(6)
=
(
Λnn 0nm
0mn Λmm
)(
M (F)nn M (F)nm
M (F)mn M (F)mm
)
(7)
where Λnn is a n × n diagonal matrix of stable roots, strictly lower than
1/
√
β where β is the discount factor of the policy maker, and Λmm is a
m×m diagonal matrix of unstable roots. Then, the unique converging path
is determined by a linear relationship between non-predetermined variables
and predetermined variables (Blanchard and Kahn (1980)):
Etqt+1 = −N (F)mnkt+1 = −M (F)−1mmM (F)mn kt+1 and
q0 = −N (F)mnk0 = −M (F)−1mmM (F)mn k0.
This describes ”jumps” of non-predetermined variables to the stable man-
ifold generated by predetermined variables. Then, the orthogonalized non-
predetermined variables (denoted q
′
t) with unstable roots are linear combina-
tions of orthogonalized predetermined variables with convergent eigenvalues
(Blanchard and Kahn (1980) equation A6, p.1310). The formal derivation of
matrix N (F) in the general case including stochastic shocks and when the
generalized Schur method is necessary is presented in McCandless (2008),
section 6.8.
If the Central Bank defines a rule on both predetermined and non-predetermined
variables (F1n,F1m), this rule is observationally equivalent to a rule which
depends only on predetermined variables with weights
(
F
′
1n, 01m
)
where the
Central Bank imposes restrictions on the coefficients of the policy feedback
rule, with all weights of non-predetermined variables equal to zero. This is
detailed as follows:
rt − r∗ = −F1n
(
kt+1 − k∗
k∗
)
− F1m
(
qt+1 − q∗
q∗
)
(8)
= −(F1n − F1mNmn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
′
1n
(
kt+1 − k∗
k∗
)
, (9)
F=(F1n,F1m) = (F1n − F1mNmn, 01m) . (10)
The policy-maker only needs to control predetermined variables:
max
{Rt}
− 1
2
+∞∑
t=0
β ′t
[
Q
′
nn
(
kt − k∗
k∗
)2
+ ρ (rt − r∗)2
]
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with a reduced loss function with weights Q
′
nn depending only on pre-
determined variables, which are observationally equivalent to the initial loss
function depending on both non pre-determined variables and pre-determined
variables according to the following equality:
Q
′
nn = Qnn +N (F)
T
nmQmmN (F)mn +QnmN (F)mn +N (F)
T
nmQmn
subject to the closed loop system of pre-determined variables:
kt+1 =
(
A
′
nn −Bn1F
′
1n
)
kt. (11)
According to the following equality:
A
′
nn = Ann −AnmNmn and F
′
1n = F1n − F1mNmn (12)
the closed loop system of pre-determined variables is observationally equiv-
alent to the top half of partitioned matrices of the non-controllable closed
loop system including also non pre-determined variables:
(
kt+1
tqt+1
)
=
(
Ann −Bn1F1n Anm −Bn1F1m
Amn −Bm1F1n Amm −Bm1F1m
)(
kt
qt
)
with (13)(
kt+1
tqt+1
)
=
(
Inn
−Nmn
)(
kt+1
kt+1
)
and
(
kt
qt
)
=
(
Inn
−Nmn
)(
kt
kt
)
(14)
The following proposition, initially formulated for optimal policy without
pre-commitment by Blake and Kirsanova (2012), also holds for quasi-optimal
policies with commitment:
Proposition 1: (Blake and Kirsanova (2012), p.1333). Let the
closed loop transition matrix where the feedback policy rule F depends only
on predetermined variables: A−BF =
(
Ann −Bn1F1n Anm
Amn −Bm1F1n Amm
)
have all
distinct eigenvalues and be diagonalizable (which imply that the matrix pair
(An+m,n+m Bn+m,1) is controllable). Let us consider the set of policy rules
F (nS) such that A−BF has nS stable eigenvalues (below 1/
√
β where β is
the discount factor of the policy maker) and n− nS unstable eigenvalues.
Case 1. For the set of policy rules F (nS) such that nS < n, the number
of stable eigenvalues is strictly below the number of pre-determined variables,
there is no rational expectations equilibrium according to Blanchard and Kahn
(1980).
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Case 2. For the set of policy rules F (nS) such that nS = n, the number of
stable eigenvalues is strictly equal to the number of predetermined variables,
there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium according to Blanchard
and Kahn (1980).
Case 3. For the set of policy rules F (nS) such that n < nS ≤ n+m, there
are at most nS !
n!(ns−n)! ways of selecting n stable eigenvalues and eigenvectors
among a set of ns stable eigenvalues or eigenvectors, with parameters of the
rule related to non-predetermined variables constrained to be equal to zero
F1m = 0. Hence, the matrix N (F (nS))mn based on these eigenvectors is
not unique. It determines the linear relationship between non pre-determined
variables to pre-determined variables:
Etqt+1 = −N (F)mnkt+1 = −M (F)−1mmM (F)mn kt+1
which are solutions of a particular non-symmetric Riccati matrix equa-
tion.
As emphasized by Blake and Kirsanova (2012), multiple equilibria may
remain unnoticed. Choosing particular initial conditions for a DSGE may
lead to convergence to a particular equilibrium using the currently avail-
able software programming Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solutions, without
revealing the indeterminacy of the matrix N (F)mn.
Proposition 2. The following results hold for quasi-optimal rules if
Blanchard and Kahn [1980] condition holds, that is, the number of non pre-
determined variables is equal to the number of unstable eigenvalues of the con-
trolled system with the transition matrix A−BF =
(
Ann −Bn1F1n Anm
Amn −Bm1F1n Amm
)
.
For a given matrix Nmn and if the matrix pair (A
′
nn B
′
n1) is controllable,
i.e. if the following Kalman (1960) controllability matrix has full rank:
rank
(
B′nn A
′
nnB
′
1n A
′2
nnB
′
n1 ... A
′n−1
nn B
′
n1
)
= n (15)
the following results hold:
1. There is a unique symmetric positive semi-definite solution P to the
discrete algebraic Ricatti equation:
P′ = Q′ + βA′TP′A′ − βA′TP′B′ (ρ+ βB′TP′B′)−1 βB′TP′A′. (16)
2. The restricted policy rule parameters of pre-determined variables F =
(
F
′
1n, 01m
)
are uniquely determined from equation:
F
′
1n = β
(
ρ+B′TP′B′
)−1
B′TP′A′. (17)
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3. Non identification of quasi-optimal rule parameters of non pre-determined
variables (such as macro-prudential risk variables) if ever those rule param-
eters are distinct from zero:
F= (F1n,F1m) = (F1n − F1mNmn, 01m) .
4. Indeterminacy. According to proposition 1, there may be at most
(n+m)!
n!m!
multiple equilibria providing a matrix N (F)mn:
Etqt+1 = −N (F)mnkt+1 and Etq0 = −N (F)mnk0
5. Bounded solution. For the optimal policy rule F
′
1n all eigenvalues of
the closed loop transition matrix A
′
nn −Bn1F′1n are strictly less than 1/
√
β
in absolute value:
∣∣λi,A′nn−Bn1F′1n∣∣ < 1/√β, 1 ≤ i ≤ n . It follows that
lim
t→+∞
kt
(
√
β)
t . Then, non-predetermined variables are bounded because tqt+1 =
−Nmnkt+1.
6. Minimal volatility of the policy interest rate ( ρ > 0,Q = 0). In
this case, the policy rule parameters are all equal to zero. All the (stable)
eigenvalues of the open loop system A
′
nn remain unchanged in the closed loop
system |λi,A−BF| = |λi,A| < 1 (Rojas (2011)).
7. Inability of the policies to change the covariances matrix between pre-
determined and non pre-determined variables when Qmn 6= 0 and Qnm 6= 0,
as it is fixed according to Blanchard and Khan (1980) condition: Etqt+1 =
−N (F)mnkt+1.
8. Time consistency a` la Calvo (1978). As the quasi-optimal policy rule
excludes non-predetermined variables from the optimal control problem, the
Lagrange multipliers related to there variables (at the origin of time incon-
sistency issues) do not show up in the optimization.
Most of recent macro-prudential DSGE models assume simultaneously
(1) ad hoc Taylor rules augmented by non pre-determined variables such
as asset prices and private credit and compares them with non augmented
Taylor rules, (2) no asset price bubbles and no Ponzi game condition for credit
and asset prices with Blanchard and Kahn (1980) condition. These macro-
prudential DSGE models face the same identification problem as ”quasi-
optimal” rules with pre-commitment. When analyzing the identification of
all DSGE parameters and not only the rule parameters, the controllability
hypothesis is also instrumental in several demonstrations in Komunjer and Ng
(2011) appendix. Rule parameters are usually found to be in the list of least
identified parameters for specific DSGE identification analysis, while auto-
regressive components of shocks are in the list of best identified parameters,
see e.g. Caglar, Chadha and Shibayama (2012).
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3 Identification and ”over stable” rules with
Central Bank pre-commitment to financial
stability
Proposition 3 summarizes the identification, determinacy and stability prop-
erties of ”over stable” rational expectations optimal rules (Levine and Currie
(1987) terminology) with Central Bank pre-commitment to financial stabil-
ity, where the number of stable eigenvalues is larger than the number of
pre-determined variables. Woodford’s (2003) famous paper on Central Bank
interest smoothing rules are ”over stable” rational expectations optimal pol-
icy interest rate rules under commitment.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) describe a four step algorithm
for solving the optimal policy under commitment. ”Step 1 seems to disregard
the forward looking aspect of the problem. If we temporarily ignore the fact
that the q0 component of the state y0 =
(
k0−k∗
k∗
q0−q∗
q∗
)
is not actually a state
vector, then superficially the Stackelberg problem has the form of an optimal
linear regulator problem” (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, p.769).
Step one obtains the matrix P giving the optimal value of the loss function
as a solution a matrix Riccati equation and the optimal parameters of the
feedback rule F ”as if ” qt are pre-determined variables. Step 2 seeks an
”over stable” solution, that is a stabilizing solution for the yt including all
non-predetermined variables:
+∞∑
t=0
βtyTt yt < +∞, (18)
solving the Lagrangian:
−1
2
+∞∑
t=0
βt


(
kt−k∗
k∗
)T
Qnn
(
kt−k∗
k∗
)
+
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)T
Qmm
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)
+
(
kt−k∗
k∗
)T
Qnm
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)
+
(
qt−q∗
q∗
)T
Qmn
(
kt−k∗
k∗
)
+ρ (rt − r∗)2 + 2βµTt+1 (Ayt +B (rt − r∗)− yt+1)

 (19)
where 2β
′
µt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the linear constraint.
First order conditions with respect to rt and yt, respectively, are:
0 = ρ (rt − r∗) + βBTµt+1 (20)
µt = Qyt + βA
Tµt+1 (21)
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Step 3 uses the property that a stabilizing solution satisfies:
µt =
(
µk,t
µq,t
)
= P
(
kt
qt
)
=
(
Pnn Pnm
Pmn Pmm
)(
kt
qt
)
,∀t ∈ N
Then, predetermined variables, the optimal policy rule Φ and the closed
loop system can be written as a function of predetermined variables (kt, µq,t):
qt =
( −P−1mmPmn P−1mm )( ktµq,t
)
and q0 = −P−1mmPmnk0 if µq,t=0 = 0
rt = Φ
(
kt
µq,t
)
= −F
(
Inn 0nm
−P−1mmPmn P−1mm
)(
kt
µq,t
)
(
kt+1
µq,t+1
)
=
(
Inn 0nm
Pmn Pmm
)
(A−BF)
(
Inn 0nm
−P−1mmPmn P−1mm
)(
kt
µq,t
)
To interpret empirical evidence about interest rate smoothing in the
United States, Woodford (2003) eliminates the implementation Lagrange
multipliers µq,t in order to express the policy rule Φ as a history-dependent
representation of the policy rule denotedΨ depending on the variables (rt−1,kt,kt−1).
Proposition 3. If the matrix pair (An+m,n+m Bn+m,1) is controllable,
i.e. if the Kalman (1960) controllability matrix has full rank:
rank
(
B AB A2B ... An+m−1B
)
= n+m (22)
the following results hold:
1. There is a unique symmetric positive semi-definite solution P to the
discrete algebraic Ricatti equation:
P = Q+ βATPA− βATPB (ρ+ βBTPB)−1 β ′BTPA. (23)
2. Uniqueness of the policy rule parameters of all controllable (pre-determined
and non pre-determined) variables F which is determined from equation:
F = β
(
ρ+BTPB
)−1
BTPA. (24)
3. Identification of optimal rule parameters. If the closed loop transition
matrix A−BF has all distinct eigenvalues denoted λi,A−BF for 1 ≤ i ≤
n+m, there is a unique pole placement relationship between the set of distinct
eigenvalues of the closed loop matrix λi,A−BF and the unique solution of the
set of parameters of the ”as if q is predetermined” linear quadratic regulator
policy rule F . All coefficients of the ”as if q is predetermined” policy rule
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F - related to both predetermined variables and non-predetermined variables
- can be identified. Then, if Pmm is invertible, the parameters of rule Φ
applied on the pre-determined variables (kt, µq,t) are also all identified. By
contrast, the parameters of the history-dependent representation of the policy
rule Ψ applied on the variables (rt−1,kt,kt−1) are usually not identified as
their total number 2n+1 may differ from the number of distinct eigenvalues
equal to the number of state variables n+m.
4. Determinacy. Kalman’s controllability condition is a precondition for
assuming that the Lagrange multipliers related to non predetermined vari-
ables should be all equal to zero at the initial date µq,t=0 = 0 (Bryson and
Ho (1975), p.55-59; Xie (1997) provides a counter example where Kalman’s
controllability condition is not satisfied). As the Lagrange multipliers are re-
lated to the optimal value function matrix as follows: µz,t = Pzt,the initial
values of non-predetermined variables are linear functions of the initial val-
ues of predetermined variables (Ljundqvist and Sargent’s (2012, Chapter 19),
Jensen (2011)):
q0 = −P−1mmPmnk0 if µq,t=0 = 0. (25)
5. Bounded solution. For this policy rule F all eigenvalues of the closed
loop transition matrix A−BF (defining the evolution of the system un-
der control) are strictly less than 1/
√
β in absolute value. It follows that
lim
t→+∞
kt
(
√
β)
t = lim
t→+∞
Et−1qt
(
√
β)
t = 0. Thus the policy reaction function ensures
a finite loss and we may omit consideration of the Blanchard and Kahn’s
(1980) conditions on no bubbles on non-predetermined and predetermined
variables (Levine and Currie’s (1987) ”over-stable” feedback rule and Wood-
ford (2003)).
6. Minimal volatility of the policy interest rate ( ρ > 0,Q = 0). It is such
that stable eigenvalues of the open loop system are the same as in the closed
loop system |λi,A−BF| = |λi,A| < 1 and that unstable eigenvalues (indexed by
i′) of the open loop system are mirrored by stable eigenvalues in the closed
loop system having their modulus such that |λi′,A−BF| = 1/ |λi′,A| < 1 (Rojas
(2011)).
7. Ability of policies to decrease the covariances matrix between pre-
determined and non pre-determined variables when the policy maker pref-
erences are such that Qmn 6= 0 and Qnm 6= 0.
8. Time inconsistency a` la Calvo (1978). When the system is controllable
and without a pre-commitment constraint, a policy maker who optimize again
on period t + 1 would choose an initial condition µq,t+1 = 0 instead of the
optimal path µq,t+1 6= 0 decided on date t. The system remains bounded and
stable if ever the policy maker chooses µq,t+k = 0 on all following periods
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( k > 1): the policy maker is not time inconsistent in the sense of promoting
the instability of pre-determined variables, instead of their stability.
4 Conclusion
Parameters of financial instability variables in optimal policy rules with Cen-
tral Bank commitment to financial stability can be identified, whereas it is
not the case for ”quasi-optimal” rules. Moreover, Kalman’s (1960) controlla-
bility condition is a sufficient condition for determinacy and stability of these
optimal policy rule under commitment.
Many extensions of optimal rules under commitment to financial stability
are feasible. Firstly, all existing macro-prudential DSGE papers including an
ad hoc augmented Taylor rules can be extended with additional simulations of
optimal rules under commitment. These simulations and estimations would
then be compared with the ones of ad hoc augmented Taylor rules. Secondly,
robust optimal control a` la Hansen and Sargent (2008), where the Central
Bank optimal policy intends to minimize the worst of outcomes where they
do not know with certainty fundamentals (as in Lorenzoni (2010)), is close
to nowadays policy makers concerns.
Finally, the parameters of the Central Bank loss function should be en-
dogenously determined. They result from a delegation problem taking into
account the bargaining powers of the private sector divergent interests be-
tween lenders versus borrowers and between the banking sector versus non-
financial sectors. Big banks benefit from financial instability over the business
cycle through higher returns and larger informational rents during booms
while being bailed out in case of distress. More precisely, the legal insti-
tutions surrounding the pre-commitment to a financial stability mandate
should be investigated. Not only the Central Bank should be independent
from government, but also it should be independent from the private banking
sector.
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